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The common law has historically been clear – the rights of the unborn do not 
exist prior to birth.  A child becomes a legal person and able to enforce legal 
rights upon being born alive and having a separate existence from his or her 
mother.  This article assesses whether new developments in biomedical 
technologies have left this legal principle inviolate and answers the question 
as to what is the state of law in relation to pre-birth.  It is argued that there is 
a pre-birth continuum where the law punctuates points in a lineal timeline 
fashion as to when a pre-birth ‘non-entity’ becomes a legal entity. The article 
concludes that there is no singular rule of law with respect to being or 
becoming a human but rather a collection of discrete and increasingly 
divergent legal categories. This recognition of a pre-birth continuum or 
timeline as to the legal recognition of this ‘non-entity’ has significant 
ramifications for the future development of law and impact on legal thinking 
about what it means to be human. 
INTRODUCTION 
At common law, a human does not attain legal rights until being “born alive”.1   This 
traditional assumption permeates the common law – both civil and criminal. This article 
suggests that the allure of this rule lies in its simplicity rather than its accuracy and that in 
part it is a legal fiction which hides both the pragmatism of the common law in finding 
exceptions to the general rule and the growing legislative intervention which is changing 
both the legal functions of creating rights and affording protection to the unborn child, 
embryo or fetus in this area.
2
   
At first blush this argument is not new.  The classification of the fetus in law has always 
been a work of legal fiction, as stated in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Tremblay v Daigle [1989] 2 SCR 530:  
The tasks of properly classifying a foetus in law and in science are different pursuits. 
Ascribing personhood to a foetus in law is a fundamentally normative task. It results 
in the recognition of rights and duties - a matter which falls outside the concerns of 
scientific classification. In short, this court's task is a legal one. Decisions based 
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upon broad social, political, moral and economic choices are more appropriately left 
to the legislature. 
On closer analysis since 1989, when the above judicial commentary was made, there has 
been a rapid escalation in pressure upon the law to respond to biomedical developments.  
These new biomedical possibilities, such as cloning Matilda, Australia’s first sheep in 
2000 and creating the first Australian embryonic stem cell line (2004) bring us to the 
threshold of regulatory questions which cut across the disciplines of law, ethics, morals, 
politics, economics and religion.  As a result within almost all areas of law there is a 
necessity to address issues as to the regulation, rights, protection of the not yet conceived, 
the embryo, the fetus, the unborn child.  In short biomedical developments have thrown 
the development of a pre-birth continuum into sharp relief.  
 
What is new therefore is not the traditional common law ‘born alive’ rule being subject to 
stress, as this has always been the case particularly around pregnancy where issues such 
as abortion and conflicting maternal and fetal interests have been the subject of much 
historical and ongoing debate.
3
  Rather it is that biomedical developments are forcing 
judges and legislators to recognize, define and then afford rights or protection to a 
human, a fetus, a embryo or an unborn child in areas as diverse as patents, discrimination, 
cloning, torts, inheritance, child protection, family law, immigration, contracts, criminal 
law and discrimination law.
4
   
 
The pre-birth continuum 
This article explores whether the legal response across these areas is consistent and 
suggests three outcomes from this analysis.  Firstly, current legislative and judicial 
authority illustrate that the legal response is pragmatic with the recognition of the ‘pre-
birth entity’ differing according to the regulatory purpose and policy objectives of the 
particular legal area.   Secondly, it is argued that this legally pragmatic segregated 
development may be mapped as a pre-birth continuum.  This concept of continuum 
mapping reflects the ‘timeline’ notion that the law has utilized in recognizing the 
existence of an entity. Rather than affording legal rights and responsibilities the timeline 
is a continuum as to when ‘some thing’ exists in law – or as to when there is ‘not 
nothing’.5   Finally this legal continuum of a pre-birth entity suggests that the question as 
to when life begins at law depends upon why the law is asking the question, the essence 
of a pre-birth continuum being determined by reference to the area of law in which the 
question is asked.  This adds a biomedical dimension to the three models of the maternal-
fetal relationship.
6
  These three models – that the fetus is a part of the woman’s body; that 
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the woman and her fetus may be indivisibly linked and the third, that they may be viewed 
as separate entities – may now be supplemented by a legal continuum which does not 
define a fetus in relation to the rights of its mother but rather defines the existence of a 
pre-birth entity in terms of the legal recognition required by a specific policy area of law.  
  
Three significant legal ramifications (apart from moral, religious and ethical 
ramifications
7
) flow from accepting a pre-birth continuum: 
(1) policymakers may continue to implement through statute different timeline points 
of recognition as to when a not yet conceived child, a embryo and/or a fetus 
moves from non-entity to a legal entity; 
(2) judges may similarly continue to do so in common law and statutory 
interpretation; and  
(3) a universal legal definition of human life is not required as it is the policy needs of 
particular areas of the law which will drive the recognition, definition, legal 
protection and rights along a pre-birth continuum.   
 
THE IMPACT OF BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION   
The ‘born alive’ rule dominates legal recognition of the rights of a human being.  There is 
a long line of authority which establishes that, for purposes of the civil law including 
succession law, the parens patriae jurisdiction and the law of torts, the position is as 
stated by Sir George Baker in Paton v British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees 
[1979] QB 276 at 279:
8
  
The foetus cannot, in English law, in my view, have a right of its own at least until it 
is born and has a separate existence from its mother. That permeates the whole of the 
civil law of this country (I except the criminal law, which is now irrelevant) ...  
This rule is broadly replicated in the criminal law
9
 and forms the basis of fundamental 
legal doctrines such as murder and negligence which incorporate this rule.  For example, 
no homicide may be committed unless a human being is killed, no tort liability is possible 
unless the interests of a human being are traversed.   
Until the middle of the twentieth century the ‘born alive’ rule has been fairly 
unassailable.  Indeed, so much so that within the life matrix of birth and death the 
overwhelming majority of legal debate focuses upon the question of end of life decisions 
rather than upon the beginning of life.   While areas such as the legality of euthanasia, the 
creation and enforcement of living wills have been and are still being extensively debated 
                                                                                                                                                 
woman and her unborn child to determine a ‘rights conflict’, where for example, a pregnant woman smokes 
or drinks during pregnancy to the extent of harming her fetus. 
7
 It is questionable whether such factors can or should be removed from debate, however discussions of 
positive law theory are beyond the parameters of this paper. 
8
See also C v S [1988] QB 135 at 140;  Attorney-General (Qld) v T (1983) 57 ALJR 285 at 286.  
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 For interesting judicial commentary and criticism on the nature and scope of the rule at criminal law see R 
v Iby [2005] NSWCCA 178 
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in our community it is curious to note that the other end of our lives – when life begins 
has not received the same attention.  A lack of such debate is also surprising given the 
absence of a universally accepted definition of ‘human being’ provided in Australian 
cases or legislation nor does such a definition exist in international treaties such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
10
 nor in legal dictionaries.
11
   
The relative dearth of discussion
12
 is highlighted by the plethora of legal responses which 
have been necessitated by recent biomedical and other technological developments.  In  
light of these development the ‘born alive’ rule is insufficient to inform legal 
developments.  Indeed, as the following discussion illustrates, there has been an 
escalation in legislation being enacted and interpreted as applicable or not to the unborn.  
There is also an increase in case law which while not particularly authoritative, is 
nonetheless notable in dealing with the difficult, complex and novel issues which arise at 
the forefront of legal development.  It is these developments which have thrown into 
sharp relief the pragmatism of the law in developing a pre-birth continuum.
13
  
Patent Law 
 
In 2004 section 18(2) the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) which states “Human beings, and the 
biological processes for their generation, are not patentable inventions…” was interpreted in 
two decisions of the Deputy Commissioner of Patents, Mr D Herald,  in Fertilitescentrum 
AB and Luminis Pty Ltd [2004] APO 19 (13 July 2004) and Woo-Suk Hwang [2004] APO 
24 (9 September 2004).  In both cases the patent applications were refused on the basis 
that the applicants claims related to an attempt to generate a human being.
14
  These 
                                                 
10
 It has bee argued that international law does envisage human rights protection for the unborn, see the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966: Sentence of death shall not be imposed for 
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.  
See Fleming JI, “The Jurisprudence of Abortion Human Rights, the Consensus Gentium and Abortion” 
Paper given at the First World Congress on Family Law and Children’s Rights, 4-9 July, 1993 Sydney at 
508. On the other hand Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 states “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, which means that “persons are recognized in 
international law, as human beings having been born.” 
11
 See, eg, Black’s Law Dictionary and the Butterworth Concise Australian Legal Dictionary. 
12
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decisions (and the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002 (Cth) and Prohibition of Human Cloning 
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human beings, fetuses, embryos, or fertilised ova or totipotent human cells that are the products of nuclear 
transfer procedures, and methods of in vitro fertilisation or cloning methods which generate human beings, 
fetuses, embryos, or fertlised ova or totipotent human cells.  See also James Cherry, Intellectual Property 
update,  Patent Office decision on nuclear transplantation techniques  
http://www.freehills.com.au/publications/publications_1383.asp viewed 24 December 2004 
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decisions are significant in Australian patent law as they mark the first application of 
ss18(2)
15
. 
 
 
Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis Pty Ltd [2004] APO 19 (13 July 2004) 
 
Fertilitescentrum and Luminis Pty Ltd filed a patent application based on a discovery that 
a substance called 'granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor' (GM-CSF) which 
involved growing pre-blastocyst human embryos in a medium containing this new 
invention, GM-CSF. The basic concept of the invention is that the chemical brings 
advantages in better simulating the natural environment, and reducing apoptosis of cells 
in the blastocyst, resulting in greater success in implantation, and babies of greater body 
mass and having fewer complications compared to IVF babies born without the benefit of 
the method. The substance is present in the natural environment of the fallopian tube and 
the invention involves ensuring its presence in an IVF environment.   
 
As filed the application included claims to a culture medium, to a method of growing 
preblastocyst human embryos, and an IVF program.  During examination, the examiner 
objected to the claims to the method of growing, and the IVF program, as being contrary 
to the Australian Patents Act 1990, in particular to section 18(2).
16
 At the hearing, the 
applicants argued that a human being was generated at fertilisation, and since the claimed 
method was applied at a later stage, it could not be deemed to be a process for generating 
a human being.  Instead, the applicant argued it was a method of medical treatment
17
 of a 
human being rather than a method of generating a human being which was prohibited by 
s18(2) of the Patents Act 1990.  
 
At first blush subsection 18(2) looks straightforward, however on analysis it states that 
human beings are not patentable inventions without supplying any definition of what 
constitutes a `human being'. Indeed as the Deputy Commissioner states:
18
 
 
 This section, which superficially looks very simple, has the inherent difficulty of 
defining the exclusion by reference to `human beings', without any definition of 
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 Up until this point there was a relatively clear demarcation between inventions encompassed by the 
exclusion provision in section 18(2) such as totipotent cells or groups of cells that, on their own, develop 
into a human embryo and inventions which include human beings, fetuses, embryos or fertilised ova and 
methods of in vitro fertilisation or cloning that generate such things. At the other end of the spectrum, 
human genes, tissues and cell lines are clearly outside the exclusion provision and are therefore patentable, 
provided that they meet all other statutory requirements. Inventions involving genetic materials and 
technologies for which IP Australia has granted patent protection include: synthetic genetic or DNA 
sequences; mutant forms and fragments of genetic sequences (including polymorphisms); isolated or 
recombinant DNA coding for a sequence of a gene; proteins expressed by a gene; vectors containing a 
gene; probes for a gene; methods of transformation using a gene; host cells, higher plants or animals 
carrying a gene; and recombinant DNA methods—such as polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and novel 
expression systems see ALRC Report 99 Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health. 
16
 This section interacts with section 107 of the Patents Act 1990 which provides the Commissioner of 
Patents power to direct an applicant to amend a specification to remove a lawful ground of objection. 
17
 Bristol Myers Squib Co  v FH Faulding & Co [1998] 860 FCA 
18
 At [12]. 
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what constitutes a `human being'. Reproductive technology exposes a range of 
fundamental issues concerning the nature of human life vis-à-vis human beings - 
issues that are essentially ethical or moral in nature, with no clear scientific answer. 
 
The question posed in Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis Pty Ltd highlights difficulty in 
drawing a clear line between those inventions within the exclusion provisions and those 
outside it – when is a human a human being for the purposes of section18(2) of the 
Patents Act 1990?  The omission of the legislation to define human being provided the 
Deputy Commissioner with an opportunity to reflect and determine what is a ‘human 
being’ - the claimed method was excluded from patentability as it was found to be a step 
along the path of generating a human being, and therefore covered by the exclusion in 
ss18(2)  of the Patents Act 1990.  
 
To arrive at this outcome the Deputy Commissioner reflected upon the practical 
application,
19
 the history
20
 and the interpretation of section 18(2).  In determining the 
correct interpretation of section 18(2) it is noted that the section has the two components: 
Human beings, and the biological processes for their generation.
21
  The Deputy 
Commissioner considered the following approaches to interpreting section 18(2): 
 
1. to ask the question – ‘at what point in the reproductive process does a human 
being come into existence?’22 
 
The Deputy Commissioner notes the fundamental problem with this question is the 
‘absence of any legislative or agreed societal definition of what constitutes a human 
being’.   
 
2. to focus upon the ‘wrong’ that Parliament is addressing  (using statutory 
interpretation techniques).
23
 
 
The Deputy Commissioner notes this approach also lacks merit given ‘…that s.18(2) 
owes its existence more to political process than to detailed policy deliberation’24 and that 
                                                 
19 The Deputy Commissioner raised 12 broad illustrative questions of the difficulties raised in defining a 
human being through biomedical technology.  Three of these as examples are (1)‘Is there a difference 
between a human life form, and a human being? Is a human being in full existence in the human life form 
that exists at fertilisation, or does it entail extra characteristics that are imparted during some part of the 
gestation (or even after birth)?’ (2) ‘Is sorting to preferentially select sperm of a particular sex (or other 
genetic characteristics) part of a process of generating a human being? Is selection of fertilised ovum for 
implantation, on the basis of (for example) greatest viability or of sex, part of a process of generating a 
human being? Is genetic treatment of sperm or ovum such that the fertilised ovum will not be affected by a 
genetic defect, part of the process for generating a human being?’ (3) ‘In the context of gene therapy, how 
much `non-human' DNA can be present in a foetus before it is considered to be non-human?’ 
20
 The Deputy Commissioner review of the history on the late inclusion of ss18(2) into the Patents Act 
provides a background as to the political intentions during the legislative process in 1990. 
21
 At [26] 
22
 At [27] 
23
 At [29] 
24
 At [25] 
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it essentially would replicate the first approach of determining what constitutes a human 
being. 
 
3.  to ‘explicitly recognise that there is no agreement about when in the  
reproductive process a human being comes into existence’25 
 
The third approach, preferred and applied by the Commissioner
26
 is that for the purposes 
of section 18(2) the generation of a human being (as distinct from a human life form) 
occurs over a substantial period of time.  The Commissioner notes there must be a start 
and end point as human life is created at fertilization and ends with full status being 
obtained upon birth:
27
   
 
The prohibition of `human beings' in my view is a prohibition of patenting of any 
entity that might reasonably claim the status of a human being. Clearly a person that 
has been born is covered by this exclusion. But to the extent that there is a process of 
generation of a human being that lasts from fertilisation to birth, I consider that a 
fertilised ovum and all its subsequent manifestations are covered by this exclusion.  
 
The Deputy Commissioner pinpoints a starting point of human life for the purposes of 
s18(2), as ‘…being when the sperm enters the ovum - for at that time the ovum has all it 
needs to go on and develop as a human being.’28  Following Fertilitescentrum AB and 
Luminis Pty Ltd the prohibition on patenting of `human beings' extends to the patenting 
of any entity that might reasonably claim the status of a human being, including a 
fertilised ovum and all its subsequent manifestations.  The parameters of this definition 
were subsequently explored in the decision on section 18(2) in Woo-Suk Hwang [2004] 
APO 24 (9 September 2004). 
 
Woo-Suk Hwang [2004] APO 24 (9 September 2004) 
 
In this decision the patent application claimed for a method of producing achimeric 
embryos by employing inter-species nuclear transplantation technique was again 
refused.
29
  While this decision again the interprets s18(2) the Deputy Commissioner notes 
two differences between this case and that of Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis Pty Ltd 
firstly, that there is no step of fertilization and secondly, that the embryo is a hybrid 
involving both human and bovine (cow ovary) DNA.  
 
The Deputy Commissioner returns to the starting point of a human being developed in 
Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis Pty Ltd and refines when and what fertilisation for the 
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 At [37] 
28
 At [32] 
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 Specifically, the embryo is created by transferring the nucleus of a human cell into a bovine ovum, and 
activating the ovum - the method therefore creates an embryo where the nuclear DNA is human, and the 
mitochondrial DNA is bovine (a cow).  
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purposes of human life constitutes for s18(2).  He develops fertilisation more broadly to 
capture the claim made in this application stating:
30
   
 
In natural reproductive processes, the activation of an ovum arises as a direct result 
of the fertilisation process. However it is clear that fertilisation by a sperm is not the 
only way in which an ovum can be activated. In my view, an ovum that has been 
artificially activated is in principle no different to an ovum that has been fertilised by 
natural means (noting of course that the DNA content of the ovum will be different.) 
Accordingly the fact that the claimed method uses postactivation of the ovum does 
not remove the process from the ambit of s18(2). 
   
This extension of the creation of a human being from natural means to include artificially 
activated processes is significant.  At a practical level as patent law aims to encourage 
innovation, this decision may limit the new forms of processes which researchers are 
prepared to embark upon in Australia with respect to assisted reproductive technology 
and at a theoretical or even theological level it indicates that the notion of ‘natural’ 
procreation is not necessary for the creation of a legal human being for the purposes of 
the Patent Act 1990.  
 
A further difference
31
  between this case and Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis Pty Ltd  
is the presence of non-human DNA.  The Deputy Commissioner states:
32
 
 
The embryo produced by the claimed process has both human and bovine DNA 
present. It is clear that the nuclear DNA is intended to be entirely human DNA. The 
mitochondrial DNA, which essentially is relevant to the energy use of the cell, is 
entirely bovine. The primary physical characteristics of mammals are governed by 
the nuclear DNA of the cells. In my view, the presence of the bovine mitochondrial 
DNA does not take away the essentially human characteristic of the embryo that is 
determined by the nuclear DNA. That is, the embryo that is produced by this method 
- while being hybrid - is properly described as human.   
 
Therefore, even though non-human DNA is used in this method the process fell within 
the exclusion in section 18(2).  The distinction drawn was between the human nuclear 
DNA which would govern the characteristics of this embryo and that of mitochondrial 
DNA which would not influence the genetic makeup of the resulting being.
33
  Due to its 
generality this finding may be subject to refinement in subsequent cases.  A growing 
body of research indicates that the extent of the contribution of mitochondria in the 
creation of the human genetic process is unclear.  Indeed this research challenges the 
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 Significantly Woo-Suk Hwang is also the first Australian administrative or judicial decision to discuss the 
prohibitions on human cloning introduced in the Commonwealth jurisdiction in 2002.  This discussion 
arose through the application of s50(1)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 which prohibits the grant of a patent for 
an invention which would be contrary to law. This is a discretionary prohibition where the Commissioner 
may still issue a patent. The Deputy Commissioner confirmed that the creation of such a hybrid embryo 
(animal DNA together with human DNA) was prima facie prohibited by section 20 of the Prohibition of 
Human Cloning Act 2002 and in his opinion would not be allowable under s50 of the Patents Act 1990. 
32
 At [9] 
33 Mitochondria being special parts of a cell found in the cytoplasm which is basically all of the cell except 
for the nucleus. 
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assumption that mitochondrial DNA will not influence the genetic makeup of the 
resulting human being.  For example six genetic disorders have been traced to 
mitochondrial DNA
34
 indicating that while it is the only non-nuclear constituent of the 
cell, the fact that it has its own DNA will impact upon the creation of a human being. 
 
Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis Pty Ltd and Woo-Suk Hwang punctuate the point at 
which society has crossed the threshold of requiring a legal position
35
 on the definition of 
a human being. As biotechnology, especially biomedical biotechnology, is becoming the 
new economic force in the knowledge economy
36
 it is not surprising that in Australia the 
threshold issue as to defining the exact moment that a human life begins has been initially 
examined and observations made by the Patents Office for the purposes of the Patents 
Act 1990 (Cth). Unsurprising as the purpose of issuing patents is to encourage innovation, 
a patent being the primary commercial vehicle for the grant and protection of an 
intellectual property right by the State to the inventor of a new, inventive and useful 
product or process.
37
    
 
By way of creating a pre-birth continuum, the decisions of the Patent Office are of course 
specific to the governing legislation of the Patents Act 1990.  Within this specific legal 
context the decisions create a legal concept as to when for the purposes of s18(2) ‘Human 
beings, and the biological processes for their generation..’ occur in law.  The fact that the 
law recognizes an entity is highlighted as the point at which a legal non-entity ceases to 
be and an entity is created differs between the two cases.  Fertilitescentrum AB and 
Luminis Pty Ltd identifies that the biological process of generating a 'human being' begins 
‘… when the sperm enters the ovum - for at that time the ovum has all it needs to go on 
and develop as a human being’.38  In Woo-Suk Hwang this process takes place artificially.   
The law will therefore respond to science and other disciplines and belief systems such as 
religion and morality within its own normative framework for, as Curtis states:
39
   
 
... one common assertion is that life begins at conception. But, when, exactly does 
conception occur? Does it occur when the sperm cell begins to traverse the zona 
pellucida of the egg, or when the sperm's acrosome releases its enzymes, allowing 
the sperm to touch the plasma membrane of the egg? ... Paternal and maternal genes 
remain separate and distinct for 24 hours after entrance of the sperm into the oocyte's 
                                                 
34
 Randall T, “Mitochondrial DNA: A new frontier in acquired and inborn gene defects” (1991) 266 
Journal of the American Medical Association 1739.  For a more current report see the Mitochondrial 
Human Genome Report at http://www.mitomap.org/report.html viewed 1 May 2006. 
35
 These decisions are essentially administrative in nature but have been described as ‘quasi-judicial’. 
36
 See the Australian Biotechnology Report 2001, Ernst and Young 2001, The Australian Biotechnology 
Report 2001, http://www.ey.com/global/Content.nsf/Australia/Australian Biotechnology_Report__2001 
viewed 15 April 2006, in 2003 the UK House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee Report on 
Biotechnology, 2003, writes of the Australian biotechnology industry  “In Australia… total revenues 
among publicly traded companies increased 38 per cent from $666 million in 2001 to $920 million in 2002. 
The number of … people employed in the industry jumped 24 % from 5,201 to 6,464.” 
37
 In Australia an invention will be patentable if it is a ‘manner of manufacture’ within the meaning of s 6 
of the Statute of Monopolies; is novel; involves an inventive or innovative step; is useful; and has not been 
used secretly within Australia prior to filing the patent.   
38
 At [32] 
39
 Curtis MG, “Cloning and Stem Cells: Processes, Politics and Policy” Current Women’s Health Reports 3 
at 492 
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cytoplasm and another 24 to 36 hours pass before the combination of the two genetic 
pools actually begins to direct cell function. Does conception begin when they 
simply fuse or when the fused nuclei become functional as a unit? It is clear that 
despite the scientific knowledge about the orderly steps of fertilization and early 
human reproduction, the ‘simple’ assertion that life begins at conception is fraught 
with complexities, and scientific knowledge fails to provide a defining boundary of 
when, exactly, conception occurs. 
 
Law therefore departs from science.  The area of patent law creates its own legal 
conceptions of a human being, determining its own reference points for conception 
and processes for generating human beings.  The concept of humanness is a 
continuum for as Commissioner Herald states in Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis 
Pty Ltd the ‘…process of generation of a human being lasts from fertilisation to 
birth’.40   
 
Cloning 
Cloning again sees the biological status of the fetus translated into a legislative status.  As 
with the decisions on patents, the cloning legislation introduced in all Australian 
jurisdictions in 2002/2003 is a recent development.   
 
The cloning legislation implements definitions of embryo and fetus not formerly 
prescribed in law.  For example section 4 of the Human Cloning And Other Prohibited 
Practices Act 2003 (NSW) defines a human embryo as: 
 
…a live embryo that has a human genome or an altered human 
genome and that has been developing for less than 8 weeks since 
the appearance of 2 pro-nuclei or the initiation of its development 
by other means.  
 
This broad definition reflects the understanding of an organism which develops from 
fertilisation until 8 weeks when it no longer is an embryo for the purpose of the cloning 
legislation. At 8 weeks it becomes a fetus.  
 
Similarly to patent law, the legal regulation of cloning starkly exposes the law coming to 
terms with the use of human embryos in biomedical innovation.   Cloning is an area 
where science has moved past the point of even needing the law to locate and/or define 
rights between the pregnant mother and the unborn child. In the words of McLachlin J, as 
her Ladyship then was, in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Winnipeg Child & 
Family Services (Northwest Area) v G [1997] 3 SCR 925 delivering the judgment of the 
majority at [12] – ‘[T]he issue is not one of biological status, nor indeed spiritual status, 
but of legal status.’   
 
                                                 
40
 At [37] 
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The recognition of a pre-birth continuum which lasts from pre-fertilization to birth is to 
recognize not only that the law develops independently of medicine, morality or ethics to 
define the legal status of a fetus, but also to identify that legal status is itself not a 
universal concept, that: 
(1) there is no precise, scientific definition of an embryo meaning the law creates its 
own legal requirements
41
 – as the recent Lockhart review on cloning states 
‘[D]evelopments in Assisted Reproductive Technology over the past three 
decades have made it more important to provide an adequate biological and legal 
definition of an embryo.’42   
(2) there is variance in legal terminology.  In direct contradiction with the above 
definition - at  common law the term foetus is used to describe a child in utero as 
young as 3½ weeks.
43
  Such variance in legal terminologies may be rationalized 
through a pre-birth continuum, by acknowledging that areas of law develop in 
isolation akin to legal silos with each creating its own recognition of the 
developing entity upon a lineal time-line. 
 
Infertility Statutes 
Three states have specific legislation governing the provision of assisted reproductive 
technologies – South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia.  The legislation in each 
jurisdiction is not uniform however all these States broadly regulate the provision, use 
and information pertaining to services such as in vitro fertilization.   
 
The Victorian Infertility Treatment Act 1995 and the South Australian Reproductive 
Technology (Code of Ethical Practice) Regulations 1995 use the same definition for a 
human embryo as the cloning legislation. Section 3 states: 
 
"human embryo" means a live embryo that has a human genome or an altered human 
genome and that has been developing for less than 8 weeks since the appearance of 2 
pro-nuclei or the initiation of its development by other means; 
 
                                                 
41
 Indeed, even within a discrete legal area, definitions are fluid.  For example, in 2005 the Lockhart review 
which was a report on the Federal Prohibition of Human Cloning Act  2002 and the Research Involving 
Human Embryos Act 2002 states that an embryo, for the purposes of cloning, should be defined as: 
…a discrete living entity that has a human genome or an altered human genome and that has 
arisen from either: 
(i) the first mitotic cell division when fertilization of a human oocyte by a human sperm is 
complete; or 
(ii) any other process that initiates organized development of a biological entity with a human 
nuclear genome or altered human nuclear genome that has the potential to develop up to, or 
beyond,  14 days  
and has not yet reached eight weeks of development. 
This new definition is seen as being a more accurate reflection of medical understanding  as to the 
beginning of an embryo as it encompasses the two ways of making an embryo.   
42
 The Lockhart report is available at http://www.lockhartreview.com.au/ viewed 1 June 2006, this 
comment comes from page 89. 
43
 Jones v Harris & Anor (Supreme Court of NSW, CA 40653/94, 10 December 1997) 
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In Western Australia the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 section 3 states  
 
“embryo” means a live human embryo, in the stage of development which occurs 
from —   
(a) the completion of the fertilisation of the egg; or  
(b) the initiation of parthenogenesis,  
to the time when, excluding any period of storage, 7 completed weeks of the 
development have occurred;  
 
It is noteworthy then that in terms of a pre-birth continuum the above Western Australian 
definition departs from the other jurisdictions.  This highlights that the pre-birth 
continuum must not just refer to areas of law but also to jurisdictions as within an area of 
law jurisdictional differences will impact upon the recognition of the fetus.   
 
 
The Law of Torts 
 
At common law an unborn child has no ability to commence an action in tort (assuming 
proceedings would be brought by a parent or other guardian in a representative capacity) 
because of the operation of the ‘born alive rule’. But if injured in utero and subsequently 
born suffering damage as a result of that injury, then upon birth the child attains the right 
to sue in tort in respect of the in utero injury.  
 
The significance of the position of the unborn child in tort is that as a matter of law, a 
‘potential’ duty of care (in the tort of negligence) can be owed to a child in utero (or even 
a child yet to be conceived), that duty can be breached whilst the child is in utero (or even 
before conception) and damage can be occasioned whist the child is in utero. But, it is not 
until the child is born, suffering damage, that there is an actionable wrong. The duty of 
care “crystallizes” upon the birth of the injured child. Clearly the law recognizes the 
rights of the unborn not to be injured but it postpones the completion of the cause of 
action and the right to recover until after birth. 
 
The well known decision of the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court in Watt v 
Rama (1972) VR 353 has long been accepted as a correct statement of Australian law on 
the issue of the recognition of the unborn in the tort of negligence
44
. In that case the 
plaintiff was born suffering brain damage and epilepsy as a result of a motor accident in 
which the plaintiff’s mother, whilst pregnant with the plaintiff, was rendered 
quadriplegic. The collision was caused by the negligence of the defendant. There was in 
1972, surprisingly, no English or Australian authority directly on whether a child “born 
with injuries caused by the pre-natal neglect of the defendant has a cause of action in 
negligence against him in respect of such injuries”.45 The court considered the 
                                                 
44
 Watt v Rama was accepted in NSW  by the Court of Appeal in Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411; It 
has been referred to and approved by the High Court on several occasions (eg: Cattanach v Melchior 
[2003] HCA 38) most recently in Harriton v Stephens; Waller v James [2006] HCA. Watt v Rama was also 
followed in England in B v Islington Health Authority (1991) 1 All ER 825 and Martell v Merton and 
Sutton Health Authority (1992) 3 All ER 820. 
45
 Watt v Rama (1972) VR 353 at 358 
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requirements for a duty of care in the tort of negligence, in particular the requirement of 
reasonable foreseeability of the plaintiff and held that pregnant women in cars are 
reasonably foreseeable as is the possibility of injury, on birth, to their unborn children. 
The court pointed out that the cause of action in negligence is not complete without 
damage to the plaintiff, so that in the case of a child in utero, the tort is complete only at 
birth, when the child is born suffering damage caused by the defendant’s negligence. 
 
It was held that:
46
 
 
…where the injury does not occur contemporaneously with the act or neglect, the 
relationship will not necessarily crystallize so as to create a duty at the time of the 
act or neglect. Where the injury to the plaintiff occurs only subsequently to the time 
of the act or neglect in circumstances where the plaintiff is not defined at that time, 
as for example where he is only one of a class, the relationship and the duty to arise 
therefrom may be said to be contingent or potential but capable of ripening into a 
relationship imposing a duty when the plaintiff becomes defined.  
 
So, using the language of the court in Watt v Rama, the plaintiff in these cases becomes 
“defined” at birth and the relationship between plaintiff and defendant, creating the duty 
of care, “ripens” at that moment. The court did not see the issue as one requiring any 
departure from the ‘born alive’ rule or the use of any fiction to ‘deem’ the plaintiff to 
have been ‘alive’ at the time of the defendant’s negligent act. Rather, the court looked to 
the elements of the tort of negligence taking the view that the last element, the damage, 
did not eventuate until the plaintiff’s birth in a damaged state. It is significant however 
that the court took the view that the unborn child who might subsequently be born 
suffering damage, was reasonably foreseeable as a member of a class of persons who 
might be injured by the defendant’s negligence.  
 
Watt v Rama was applied by the NSW Court of Appeal in Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 
NSWLR 411 , to impose a duty of care on a mother to her own child who was born 
injured as a result of a car crash caused by the mother’s negligent driving. The court was 
keen to confine the mother’s duty to her unborn child to the situation of negligent driving 
so as not to make a mother liable to her child for other acts during pregnancy. Lynch v 
Lynch was approved and applied in the Queensland decision in Bowditch v McEwan 
(2002) 36 MVR 235, and again, the court specifically limited the duty owed by the 
mother to her child to the case of her driving rather than other maternal conduct
47
.  
 
In X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 the NSW Court of Appeal decided that a child who was 
not conceived at the date of the defendant’s negligent act could acquire rights on birth, to 
sue in the tort of negligence. In this case the plaintiff was born with syphilis having been 
infected by her mother who was unaware that she carried the disease. The mother had 
previously been pregnant and her treating doctors at that time had failed to screen her for 
the disease during that earlier pregnancy. Had they done so, they would have discovered 
                                                 
46
 Per Winneke CJ & Pape J at p. 359. 
47
 The Supreme Court of Canada refused to impose a duty of care on a mother in a similar case in Dobson v 
Dobson (1999) 174 DLR (4
th
) 1 for policy reasons, see Malkin I,”A Mother’s Duty of Care to her Foetus 
While Driving: A Comment on Dobson v Dobson (and Lynch v Lynch)”  (2001) 9 Torts Law Journal 109. 
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the mother’s illness and treated her for it, thereby avoiding the risk to the plaintiff before 
the plaintiff’s conception.  
 
Clarke JA held that “a person may be subjected to a duty of care to a child who was 
neither born nor conceived at the time of his careless acts or omissions”.48 His Honour 
found this proposition “entirely consistent with what was said by the High Court…in 
Chapman v Hearse…” regarding the requirement of reasonable foreseeability of the 
plaintiff.  
 
Clarke JA stated
49
: 
 
If one postulates the duty in terms of the class or category of persons to whom it is 
owed, as I believe one should, and accepts that there may be within that class 
persons who are not born when the careless conduct occurs there is no need to resort 
to artificial concepts, such as deeming, or to be unduly troubled about the child’s 
lack of legal personality at the time of that conduct. 
 
His Honour further stated
50
: 
 
The fact that damage was suffered many years after the breach of duty has never 
been regarded as an impediment to the cause of action. Nor should, in my view, the 
fact that a particular plaintiff acquired legal personality (and suffered damage) years 
after the breach.  
 
The same approach was adopted in Kosky & Another v The Trustees of the Sisters of 
Charity [1982] VR 961 where Tadgell J in an application for an extension of the time in 
which to bring proceedings, took the view that a child was owed a duty of care by a 
hospital in respect of a blood transfusion given to the mother 8 years before the child’s 
birth. 
 
Clearly the law of tort recognizes the rights of the unborn not to be injured and provides a 
remedy, after birth, for harm occurring before birth caused by negligent acts before birth 
or even before conception. Tort law does this not by recognizing the existence of a ‘legal 
person’ before birth, but certainly it recognises that a child in utero can be the victim of a 
negligent act and that a child in utero, or even before conception is one of a class of 
reasonably foreseeable persons. Tort law sees and adopts the whole of the pre-birth 
continuum, at least for the purposes of determining reasonable foreseeability of a 
plaintiff. 
 
 
 
Succession and Equity and Trusts  
 
                                                 
48
 X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 at 41 
49
 X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 at 38 
50
 X v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 at 38 
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Equity and trust law has always acknowledged the existence of unborn children.  Many 
of the cases discussed in other categories in this article such as those seeking injunctions 
are of course seeking equitable remedies.  As stated in Yunnghams v Candoora No 19 Pty 
Ltd BC9908449 (discussed below) by Justice Gillard:
51
 ‘[T]he courts of equity have over 
many years responded to the need and often interfere to protect contingent rights before 
birth.’ His Honour continued ‘[N]o civilised legal system which is fair and just could 
permit the destruction or interference with the rights of the unborn to acquire an interest 
in property upon birth and survival, prior to the child becoming a legal person to protect 
its own rights.’52 
 
Traditionally the “born alive” rule has not prevented a child who was in utero at the death 
of a testator, or at the date of commencement of a trust, from taking a benefit to which he 
or she would have been entitled if living at the relevant date. Such a child when born, 
subsequently, would be entitled to a share in the trust or estate. The courts have for many 
years been prepared to recognize an “exception” to the traditional common law ‘born 
alive’ rule so as to enable the share of an unborn child in an estate or trust to take effect at 
birth as if the child had been born at the relevant date. The courts have had no hesitation 
in making orders to include in the class of beneficiaries entitled under a will or  trust, 
children who were ‘en ventre sa mere’ at the date the testamentary or trust benefit took 
effect, if they would have been so entitled, if living (ie: if already born) at that date. The 
courts have done so by applying a rule that apparently recognizes a form of contingent 
existence or deemed existence, prior to birth.  Clearly the courts have recognized that the 
child in utero is an entity deserving of protection and the issue of the state of 
development of the fetus (its place in the pre-birth continuum) has not arisen until 
relatively recently.  
 
Sir John Salmond states in the 1937 (9
th
) edition
53
 of his work: 
 
Though the dead possess no legal personality, it is otherwise with the unborn. 
There is nothing in law to prevent a man from owning property before he is 
born. His ownership is necessarily contingent, indeed, for he may never be 
born at all; but it is nonetheless a real and present ownership. A man may 
settle property upon his wife and the children to be born of her.  
 
He wrote further: 
 
          The rights of an unborn person, whether proprietary or personal, are all 
contingent on his birth as a living human being. The legal personality 
attributed to him by way of anticipation falls away ab initio if he never takes 
his place among the living…A posthumous child may inherit; but if he dies in 
the womb, or is stillborn, his inheritance fails to take effect, and no one can 
claim through him, though it would be otherwise if he lived an hour after his 
birth. (at p 424) 
 
                                                 
51
 At [115]. 
52
 At [114]. 
53
 Sir John Salmond, Jurisprudence, 9
th
 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1937, at 422. 
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There is very old authority that recognizes that the law employs a fiction when 
recognizing the property rights of the unborn. In Wallis v Hodson (1724) 2 Atk. 117; 26 
ER 472, Lord Hardwick stated the following rule: 
 
The plaintiff was en ventre sa mere … and is consequently a person in rerum 
natura so that both by the rules of the common law and civil law she was to all 
intents and purposes a child. (italics added). 
 
Lord Westerbury LC recognized such a rule in Blasson v Blasson (1864) 2 De GJ and S 
665; 46 ER 534: 
 
It is, however, material to observe that the fiction or indulgence of the law 
which treats the unborn child as actually born applies only for the purpose of 
enabling the unborn child to take a benefit which, if born, it would be entitled 
to… (italics added). 
 
In the twentieth century
54
, the House of Lords considered the issue in Villar v Gilbey 
(1907) AC 139 and again in Elliott v Lord Joicey (1935)AC 209 where their Lordships 
confirmed a rule that unborn children could be included in the class of children living at 
the date of their father’s death and held that such a rule was justified: 
 
…on the ground that such children came within the motive and reason of the 
gift and should therefore  be included by fiction or indulgence on the ground 
that it was for their benefit. (Villar v Gilbey at p. 144) (Italics added). 
 
 
These authorities were approved and applied by Gillard J in the Victorian Supreme Court 
in Yunghanns v Candoora No 19 Pty Ltd ([1999]VSC 524 (15 December 1999). But this 
case was different from the old authorities in that it involved a proceeding at a time when 
the child remained unborn, in respect of an interest that could not exist till the birth of the 
child. The earlier cases concerned applications on behalf of living children who had been 
‘en ventre sa mere’ at the time of a testator’s death or the creation of a trust.  
 
The Yunghanns case concerned an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain 
the trustee of an inter vivos trust from acting so as to exclude an unborn child as a 
beneficiary. The issue before the court was whether the father of the unborn child had any 
standing to bring the proceedings (whilst the child remained unborn) and whether the 
unborn child had any interest which could be protected before its birth. The Court 
concluded on the authorities, that the rights of the unborn child could be protected by the 
                                                 
54
  For discussion of the early authorities see Barry, JV “The Child en ventre  sa mere’, (1941) 14 the 
Australia Law Journal 351 and Winfield, P.H. “The unborn child” (1944) 8 Cambridge LJ 76.  Australian 
authorities include  Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Sleeman (1899) 25 VLR 187; In re Bruce 
[1979] Tas SR 110; Permanent Trustees Co of NSW v Ralfe (1940) 57 WN (NSW) 183; V v G [1980] 2 
NSWLR 366; Re Lawrence [1973] Qd R 201.  
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issue of an injunction and that the child’s father, in a representative capacity, could be a 
party to an action for that purpose. Gillard J stated:
55
 
 
The law has from very early times treated the foetus as a child in some 
circumstances. This has been in the area of protecting the unborn child’s right 
to property. The foetus is treated by a legal fiction as having already been 
born. (italics added). 
 
It was argued in Yunghanns that the action must fail because the child was not a legal 
person at the time of the proceedings and had no rights which could be enforced prior to 
birth. In support of this argument, two authorities were relied upon, one English, one 
Australian. Both were cases dealing with an application by a father for an order 
restraining the mother of a fetus from having an abortion.  In the English case of Paton v 
B.P.A.S. Trustees (1979) 1QB 276, the court held that the application must fail because a 
fetus could have no rights whatsoever till born and having an existence separate from its 
mother: the ‘born alive’ rule56. 
 
In the Australian case of Attorney General (Qld) (ex rel Kerr) v T (1983) 57 ALJR 285, 
at 277 Gibbs CJ in the High Court held to the same effect: 
 
            …a foetus has no right of its own until it is born and has a separate 
existence from its mother. We are here, of course, not concerned with the 
questions that arise where damage to a foetus results in the birth of a damaged 
child, or with those cases in which a will is given a fictional construction, to 
give effect to the reasons and motives of the dispositions of the testator.  
 
The court in Yunghanns distinguished both the English authority of Paton ((1979) 1 QB 
276) and the Australian High Court authority in Attorney General (Qld) (ex rel Kerr) v T. 
The basis of the distinction is that in a succession case, the orders which the court would 
make are to protect a right which an unborn child will attain at birth ( Yunghanns at para 
110), whereas in the ‘abortion’ cases the courts were considering a situation where the 
fetus could have no rights which could be enforced because there was never any intention 
or contemplation that the fetus would ever be born. The distinction seems to rest entirely 
on the issue of whether there is any possibility or likelihood that a child will be born: 
essentially whether the ‘contingent existence’ can ever become reality. Indeed, in Paton 
Sir George Baker stated at 279: 
 
…the fetus has no right of action, no right at all, until birth. The succession 
cases have been mentioned. There is no difference. From conception the child, 
may have succession rights by what has been called ‘fictional construction’; 
but the child must be subsequently born alive.  
                                                 
55
 At [116]. 
56
 Cited with approval in C v S (1988) 1 QB 135; In Re F (in utero) (1988) Fam. 122; B v Islington (1991) 1 
QB 638; DeMartell v Merton (1993) QB 204; Burton v Islington (1993) QB 204   
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A case which adds an entirely new dimension to the traditional “succession” cases 
involving the question of the rights of children ‘en ventre sa mere’, is the Tasmanian 
Supreme Court decision In The matter of the Estate of the Late K; ex parte: The Public 
Trustee  (Unreported, Supreme Court of Tasmania, Spicer J. 22 April 1996.)
57
   
 
 In that case the Public trustee as administrator of an intestate estate, sought a declaratory 
order as to whether two frozen embryos (zygotes in strict scientific terms) produced (prior 
to decease), using the sperm of the deceased and ova of his widow, were ‘issue’ pursuant 
to the relevant Tasmanian legislation dealing with distribution on intestacy. The deceased 
and his widow already had one child born by the IVF technique and they had intended to 
have the two frozen embryos implanted with a view to a further pregnancy and birth, but 
the deceased died prematurely.  
 
Three questions were put to the court: were the embryos ‘issue’ of the deceased for the 
purpose of the relevant Tasmanian succession legislation, were they living at the date of 
death and would they become children of the deceased upon being born alive? Spicer J 
reviewed the law concerning succession and the position of children en ventre sa mere at 
the time of a testator’s death. He concluded that the law had long recognised such a child 
as ‘born’ for the purpose of succession. His Honour made the observation that:  
 
The recognition of the rights of an unborn child is an artificial construction or 
fiction based on the proposition that a child en ventre sa mere, is deemed to be 
born at the time of an occurrence so far as it is necessary for the benefit of that 
child. 
 
The Court held that the embryos were not ‘issue’ of the deceased at the time of death nor 
were they ‘alive’ at the time of their father’s death. This was on the basis that ‘there was 
no human in existence’ at the time of the death of the deceased. This conclusion was 
based on the traditional ‘born alive’ rule. 
 
But the court answered the final question in the affirmative. For the purposes of 
succession, the embryos would become children of the deceased upon their being born 
alive. Spicer J asked: 
 
As a matter of policy, should the law distinguish between a child, en ventre sa 
mere, and his or her sibling who was at the same time a frozen 
embryo?...Should a right by way of the application of a legal fiction be denied 
because medicine and technology have overtaken the circumstances existent 
in the 19
th
 century when the legal fiction was applied? 
 
After reviewing the reports of various Law Reform Commissions
58
 on the issue of the 
status of posthumously conceived children or children born from stored embryos, Spicer 
                                                 
57
 See also Clarke D, “En Ventre Sa Frigidaire: Zygotes as Children” (1996) 21 Alternative Law Journal 
165. 
58
 NSW LRC Report  49, 1986 at 81;  NSW LRC In Vitro Fertilisation Law Reform Commission 58, 
1988;Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HMSO Cmnd 9314 
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J noted that several legislatures had denied succession rights to such children on 
pragmatic grounds because of the practical difficulties that would arise for executors and 
administrators of deceased estates. His Honour concluded however, that such practical 
difficulties should not fetter His court and held: 
 
If a child en ventre sa mere is not regarded as living (in terms of law) but has a 
contingent interest dependent on birth, then in logic the same status should be 
afforded an embryo. That would be so whether or not two cells, four cells, or a 
developed foetus was existent. In this case fertilization has occurred and, 
although in stasis, possesses a potential for live birth. If such be the case then 
it could be said to possess the same contingent rights as a sibling, en ventre sa 
mere. 
 
This decision highlights that settled areas of law are able to incorporate biomedical 
developments such as the freezing of embryos into the pre-birth continuum.  Further the 
decision illustrates that the pre-birth continuum is not necessarily reliant upon the growth 
or development of a fetus.   
 
The parens patriae decisions: can an unborn child be made a ward of the court?  
 
Traditionally the courts have applied the “born alive” rule to refuse ‘protection’ or 
‘guardianship’ orders in respect of unborn children. At common law, it seems that the 
“parens patriae’ jurisdiction of the court cannot be relied upon to make an unborn child a 
ward of the court. 
 
The position seems certain in Australia having regard to the decision discussed earlier of 
Gibbs CJ in the High Court in Attorney General (QLD) (Ex rel KERR) v T  (1983) 46 
ALR 275 where His Honour held that an unborn child is not a person whose existence 
can be protected by the court in its role as parens patriae. His Honour cited and approved 
the judgment of Sir George Baker P in Paton v BPAS Trustees [1979] 1 QB 276 at 279 
where the ‘born alive’ rule was relied upon. 
 
Similarly, the English Court of Appeal in Re F (in utero) [1988] 2 WLR 1288 held that it 
had no jurisdiction to make a child in utero a ward of the court. That case concerned an 
application in respect of the unborn child of a mentally ill woman who led a nomadic 
existence and who, the relevant social worker feared, would not attend hospital or obtain 
other assistance for the birth of her child.  
 
Whilst the decision was unanimous, the Justices in Re F arrived at their conclusions by 
slightly different considerations. May LJ relied on the traditional ‘born alive’ rule. His 
Lordship also considered that a wardship order would inevitably create a conflict between 
the legal rights of the mother and the inchoate rights of the unborn child. Balcombe LJ 
took a similar view relying on the notion that an unborn child has no existence separate 
from its mother. Staughton LJ held that because the life of the fetus could not be regarded 
                                                                                                                                                 
London, 1984; cf Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Human Artificial Reproduction & Related 
Matters Vols 1 & 2, 1985 at 182)   
 20 
in isolation from that of the pregnant mother and because an unborn child could not 
physically be cared for by any person until it was born, the court should not assume 
jurisdiction. His Lordship further held that it was for parliament not the courts to create a 
jurisdiction in this type of case. 
 
The Canadian Supreme Court (Full Court) decision in Winnipeg Child & Family Services 
(Northwest Area) v G ((1996) 152 DLR (4
th
) 193) by majority took the House of Lords 
view that an unborn child was not a legal person and could not therefore be protected 
under the parens patriae jurisdiciotn of the court. The dissenting judgment however, held 
at 227 that the ‘born alive’ rule “is a common law evidentiary presumption rooted in 
rudimentary medical knowledge that has long since been overtaken by modern 
science”… 
 
The High Court of New Zealand has however taken a view of the issue based on different 
considerations. In Re an Unborn Child [2003] 1 NZLR 115 Heath J held that a 
guardianship order should be made in respect of a child then in utero with the order to 
take effect immediately. The mother of the child was appointed “agent of the court” for 
the purposes of the guardianship.  
 
National television in NZ had broadcast a piece about a pornographic film to be made 
featuring the birth of a child whose mother was also to ‘star’ in the film. The chief social 
worker for the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services had grave concerns 
about the welfare of the child and applied to the court for orders placing the unborn child 
under the guardianship of the court and prohibiting the filming and publication of the 
birth of the child in any pornographic publication. 
 
The issue of guardianship and wardship jurisdiction is governed in New Zealand by ss 
10A - 10E of the Guardianship Act 1968 (NZ). Heath J held that the statute was not 
intended to supersede the inherent jurisdiction
59
 of the Court based on parens patriae, 
though it would be rare that parties would need to resort to the inherent jurisdiction given 
the scheme in the relevant legislation. Heath J held that an unborn child is a ‘child’ within 
the legislation (defined as a “person under the age of 20 years”) and that therefore it was 
unnecessary to rely on the inherent jurisdiction of the court.  
 
In concluding that the definition of child in the Act included an unborn child, Heath J 
considered several authorities including the English Court of Appeal decision in Re F (in 
utero). His Honour considered that that case was not applicable in New Zealand because 
there were significant differences in the New Zealand position which required a different 
approach and which required Re F (in utero) to be distinguished. Those were:
60
 
                                                 
59
 In Pallin v Department of Social Welfare [1983] NZLR 266 (CA)  it was held that the High Court had a 
residual jurisdiction  “to take care of those who are not able to take care of themselves” per  Cooke J at p 
272; In MvM [1983] NZLR 502 (CA) Woodhouse P recognised the Court’s jurisdiction stemming from 
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1. The adoption and ratification by NZ of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child which “expressly recognizes the creation of rights in a child at a time before 
birth”  
2. In the present case the Court would be making an order restraining the child’s 
mother from doing something rather than a mandatory order requiring the mother 
to act against her will  
3. Other NZ legislation protects the interests of unborn children (ss 182 & 187 
Crimes Act 1961 and the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act 1977). 
 
Heath J concluded
61
 that “having regard to the international obligations which have been 
assumed by New Zealand under the convention, and the other provisions of New Zealand 
law which support the interests of unborn children, I hold that the term “child” ….can 
include an unborn child”. 
 
In support of this conclusion, His Honour referred to the House of Lords’ considerations 
in Attorney Generals Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1997] 3 WLR 421 where their Lordships 
addressed the issue of whether a fetus has a human personality distinct from its mother. 
Lord Mustill stated at 429 that “the mother and the foetus [are] two distinct organisms.. .’ 
and Lord Hope of Craigend said (at p 440) “the embryo is in reality a separate organism 
from its mother from the moment of its conception”. Further, Heath J points out, the 
approach of the House of Lords had already been adopted by the Full Court of the NZ 
High Court in an appeal from the Complaints Review Tribunal under the Health and 
Disability Commissioner Act 1994
62
. 
 
The court concluded in Re an Unborn Child on the basis that the best interests of the 
child were the paramount consideration, that there was a likely risk of emotional harm to 
the child arising out of sexual exploitation of the child’s image and that therefore the 
guardianship order should be made. 
 
 The New Zealand Family Court had considered the same issue previously in In the 
matter of Baby P (an Unborn child) [1995] NZFLR 577 which concerned an application 
for a care and protection order (under s 14 Children, Young Persons and Their Families 
Act (NZ) 1989) in respect of an unborn child whose birth was imminent. In that case, 
Inglis J reached the surprising (given the then state of the authorities) conclusion that the 
late term unborn child was: 
 
 a young human being….Medically and physiologically there is only a minor, if not 
imperceptible , difference between his present stage of development and the stage he will 
be immediately after his birth…Baby P has all the characteristics of independent human 
personality (at p. 578). 
 
Heath J in Re an Unborn Child declined to follow the reasoning in the Baby P case 
noting that the decision had been criticized on several grounds
63
, most significantly that 
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there was a risk of conflict between the mother’s interests and those of the child, where 
the order would have the effect of mandating the mother’s pre-natal conduct. Heath J 
further held that the decision in Baby P was flawed firstly, because the Judge saw the 
issue of whether to exercise power in respect of an unborn child, as discretionary rather 
than jurisdictional and secondly, because the view that an unborn child is sufficiently 
developed to be to be a “young human being” was apparently based on the Judge’s own 
personal view of what constitutes sufficient development. 
 
The New Zealand decision in Re an Unborn Child is of interest to Australian lawyers 
because the main considerations, on which the decision was based, are also applicable in 
Australia. Australia is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
64
, and 
there is legislation in various Australian states protecting the rights of unborn children 
65
. 
The unusual facts of Re an Unborn Child involved considerations very different from 
those in the ‘abortion’ case of Attorney General (QLD) (Ex rel Kerr) v T, which is the 
leading Australian authority on the point. It may be that there is scope to argue in 
Australia, that there are circumstances where it would be appropriate for the Courts to 
consider making a guardianship order in respect of an unborn child, notwithstanding the 
traditional ‘born alive’ rule.  
 
Contracts  
The common law of contracts has not had to address the issue of the unborn, at least in 
the sense that there is no doubt the unborn cannot be parties to contracts.  Commercial 
surrogacy contracts which would certainly have a bearing as to the rights and welfare of 
the unborn are generally considered to be against public policy at common law.
66
   
 
The only area of Australian contract law which crosses into the pre-birth continuum is the 
statutory regulation of surrogacy agreements.  The Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld) 
prohibits surrogacy arrangements and prevents contracts which are prescribed contracts 
which are defined as:   
 
a contract, agreement or arrangement made between 2 or more persons, 
whether formally or informally and whether or not for payment or reward, 
under which it is agreed--  
(a) that a person shall become or shall seek or attempt to become the bearer of 
a child and that a child delivered as the result thereof shall become and be 
treated, whether by adoption, agreement or otherwise, as the child of any 
person or persons other than the person firstmentioned in this paragraph; or  
(b) that a child delivered from a person who is the bearer of any embryo, 
foetus or child at the time when the prescribed contract is made shall become 
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and be treated, whether by adoption, agreement or otherwise, as the child of 
any person or persons other than the person firstmentioned in this paragraph. 
 
Paragraph (b) above specifically refers to a foetus or embryo however the legislation does 
not define these terms. Equivalent state legislation does not contain any mention of the 
embryo or foetus. 
 
Criminal 
 
In criminal law there is no homicide unless a human being is killed.
67
  If an unborn child 
is not a human being there can be no homicide.  Indeed in Attorney-General (Qld) (Ex rel 
Kerr) v T (1983) 57 ALJR 285 referred to earlier, the High Court refused to intervene to 
prevent an abortion. The common law recognizes that the fetus will become a child upon 
birth while at the same time denying the fetus the legal status of a human until it is 
born.
68
   
 
The key to the approach of the criminal law to a fetus is its regulation of abortion.  There 
are three broad categories of abortion laws in Australia which make it a crime to seek, 
perform or otherwise be involved in an abortion.
69
  These are: 
 
(a) laws that create the crime of ‘unlawful abortion’  
(b) laws that create the crime of ‘child destruction’ and 
( c)the law of homicide. 
 
The demarcation between these crimes rests in the progressive stages of the pregnancy. In 
practice abortion is available in most Australian jurisdictions up to 20 weeks of 
pregnancy.
70
   
 
(a) laws that create the crime of ‘unlawful abortion’  
 
Very generally
71
 the laws that create the crime of unlawful abortion make it an offence to 
procure the death of the fetus unless there is an element of necessity that may affect the 
life of the mother or the fetus.  The offences relate to intended self-abortion’, intended 
procurement of a miscarriage of another and the knowing supply of instruments, drugs or 
                                                 
67
 At common law this requirement was expressed as the need for a ‘reasonable creature in being’.  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 art 6 para 1 uses the words ‘human being’ which 
have been said to mean ‘person inbeing’ therefore the international human rights rules do not apply to 
abortions.   
68
 See also Fortin JES, “Legal protection for the unborn child” (1988) 51 Modern Law Review 55. 
69
 For an excellent overview of Australian abortion laws see Cica N, “Abortion Law in Australia” Research 
Paper 1 1998-99, Parliament of Australia www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp01.htm viewed 29 
March 2006 
70
 See http://beta.austlii.edu.au/au/other/liac/hot_topic/hottopic/2000/5/9.html viewed 30 March 2006 
71
 Some Australian jurisdictions no longer have a crime of abortion see for example the ACT which has 
removed abortion from criminal law. 
 24 
other noxious substances designed to assist in the first two offences.
72
 The statutory 
operation of each of these crimes differs from one jurisdiction to another.  For example, 
the Menhennitt ruling in the Victorian Supreme Court in 1969
73
 provided that abortion 
could be lawful if the accused held a belief which was honest and on reasonable grounds 
that the abortion was ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’.   In New South Wales the Levine 
ruling
74
 in the District Court in 1971 stated that an abortion would be lawful if there was 
any ‘;economic, social or medical ground or reason’ upon which a  doctor could have a 
reasonable and honest belief that it was necessary to perform the abortion to avoid a 
‘serious danger to the pregnant woman’s life or to her physical or mental health.’   Since 
being reinterpreted by Kirby J in CES v Superclinics
75
 the NSW Levine ruling is 
generally viewed as a more liberal rule than that of Menhennitt.    
 
In the Australian Capital Territory the offence of abortion has been abolished.  The other 
more liberal jurisdictions
76
 are the Northern Territory, South Australia, Tasmania and 
Western Australia where it is lawful for an abortion procedure to be performed by a 
medical practitioner.
77
 The grounds on which a lawful termination may be performed 
differ as do the limitations on duration of pregnancy.  The SA Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935, for example provides that an abortion cannot be performed after 
28 weeks, the exception is where the abortion is performed in good faith and solely to 
preserve the life of the pregnant woman.  Prior to this outer time limit an abortion can be 
carried out when the ‘maternal health ground’ or the ‘foetal disability ground’ is satisfied.  
The ‘maternal heath ground’ refers to the physical or mental health of the pregnant 
woman being at risk and the ‘foetal disability ground’ is satisfied if there is a substantial 
risk that the child will be seriously physically or mentally handicapped.  The Northern 
Territory Criminal Code s174(1)(a)(i) applies where a woman is no more than 14 weeks 
pregnant and allows terminations to take place up to 23 weeks if the termination is 
necessary to prevent grave injury to the woman’s health. 
 
 (b) laws that create the crime of ‘child destruction’ and 
 
Abortion laws reflect a time line approach to the fetus as a potential human being.  This 
replicates the concept of the pre-birth continuum.  Through the child destruction 
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provisions the notion of ‘capable of being born alive’ is added to the traditional ‘born 
alive’ rule. This crime applies only to abortions performed late in pregnancy.  The crime 
of child destruction covers situations where neither the offence of abortion nor the 
offence of murder or manslaughter is appropriate.  As such, it is meant to cover the 
period where the fetus is viable – capable of being born alive – but before it is born and 
attains the status of a human being. Such a crime does not exist in Tasmania.
78
   
 
The definition of an unborn child differs between jurisdictions.  In both South Australian 
and Victoria it is unlawful to act to intend to destroy a ‘child capable of being born alive’ 
before it has an existence independent of its mother.  The exception is where that act is 
done in good faith to preserve the mother’s life.  Both South Australia and Victoria 
provide that where the pregnancy is 28 weeks or more that is prima facie proof that a 
woman is carrying a ‘child capable of being born alive’. Thus 28 weeks is the prima facie 
legal test of viability in those jurisdictions.  
 
The remaining statutes are less exact.  Most refer to a fetus being capable of being born 
alive.  For example section 165 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code does not strictly 
describe a child destruction offence and is not clearly applicable as such.  But it prohibits 
causing death to a ‘child who has not become a human being’ in such a manner that the 
person causing death would have been guilty of murder if such a child had been born 
alive,  unless the death is caused by an attempt in good faith to preserve the mother’s life.  
In the Australian Capital Territory section 42 of the Crimes Act 1900 makes child 
destruction an offence: 
 
A person who unlawfully and, either intentionally or recklessly, by any act or 
omission occurring in relation to a childbirth and before the child is born 
alive—  
        (a)     prevents the child from being born alive; or  
        (b)     contributes to the child's death;  
is guilty of an offence punishable, on conviction, by imprisonment for 15 
years. 
 
The South Australian Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 provides that an abortion 
cannot be performed in pregnancy with intent to destroy the life of a child capable of 
being born alive.  The legislation in s82A(8) states that the fact that when a woman has 
been “pregnant for a period of twenty-eight weeks or more shall be prima facie proof that 
she was at that time pregnant with a child capable of being born alive.”  Section 10 of the 
Victorian Crimes Act also creates the child destruction offence at 28 weeks.  Both South 
Australia and Victoria are prima facie offences which means that it is possible for the 
limit to be lower – United Kingdom cases have indicated that a child is capable of being 
born alive at 22-23 weeks.
79
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In Queensland and NSW new crimes have been introduced to deal with attacks on 
pregnant women.  Section 313 of the Queensland Criminal Code is titled ‘Killing unborn 
child’.80  The original and only section of the code made it a crime to unlawfully assault a 
pregnant woman and destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive:  
Any person who, when a female is about to be delivered of a child, prevents the child 
from being born alive by any act or omission of such a nature that, if the child had been 
born alive and had then died, the person would be deemed to have unlawfully killed the 
child, is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for life.  
 
Subsection (2) was subsequently added: 
 
(2) Any person who unlawfully assaults a female pregnant with a child and 
destroys the life of, or does grievous bodily harm to, or transmits a serious 
disease to, the child before its birth, commits a crime. Maximum penalty—
imprisonment for life. 
 
The purpose of subsection (2) is to make an ‘unborn child’ one that dates from 
conception.   
 
In New South Wales the 2003 case of R v King [2003] NSWCCA 399 led to similar 
reforms.  King attacked Ms Flick, who was pregnant with his child assaulting her 
including kicking her in the stomach and stomping on her stomach about half a dozen 
times. The fetus was delivered stillborn 3 days later. The pregnancy was between 23 and 
24 weeks advanced.  King was charged alternatively with the offences of intentional 
infliction of grievous bodily harm to Ms Flick and procuring a miscarriage.
81
 In relation 
to the charge of grievous bodily harm, the Crown relied upon the death of the fetus and 
the abruption of the placenta as constituting grievous bodily harm to Ms Flick. The issue 
was whether or not the death of a fetus is capable of constituting grievous bodily harm to 
a pregnant mother. The trial judge referred to the decision of the House of Lords in 
Attorney-General's Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245 as authority for the 
proposition that a fetus was a "unique organism" and as having overruled earlier authority 
that a fetus was an integral and inseparable part of the mother.  On appeal the court, 
Spigelman CJ, Dunford and Adams JJ held that the fetus was part of the body of the 
woman. 
 
The Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) was subsequently amended,
82
 individuals will now be 
punished for destruction of a fetus.
83
  Noticeably, the legislation makes no attempt to 
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define the terms ‘foetus’ and does not refer to the destruction of a fetus as murder.  
Indeed section 20 of the Crimes Act1900  (NSW) explicitly states that when a person is 
on trial for the “murder of a child, such child shall be held to have been born alive if it 
has breathed, and has been wholly born into the world whether it has had an independent 
circulation or not.”   
 
The criminal law differentiates categories of crime according to the development of the 
fetus.  In a time lineal fashion criminal law creates separate categories of crime for a 
viable as opposed to a pre-viable fetus.  Limits on late term abortions and crimes of child 
destruction reflect a recognition within this area of law that the legal recognition of a 
fetus for the purposes of crimes being committed alters along a pre-birth continuum.    
 
 
( c) the law of homicide. 
 
Every Australian jurisdiction prohibits unlawful homicide.
84
  Homicide describes a 
variety of criminal offences that cover manslaughter through to the most serious crime of 
murder.  In essence in every Australian jurisdiction, a fetus cannot be the victim of any 
kind of homicide.  This is the case irrespective of the stage of pregnancy at which it 
succumbs.  As Cica states:
85
 
 
A foetus can only be the victim of murder or manslaughter if it is born in a 
living state.  For these purposes, a child is born in a living state when it – but 
not necessarily the umbilical cord, placental tissue or afterbirth – is 
completely extruded from the pregnant woman’s body.  Except in the 
Australian Capital Territory, and in New South Wales for murder 
prosecutions, a child need not have breathed to be considered born alive.  Nor 
is it necessary that the child be viable in the sense that it has the capacity to 
stay alive.  A functioning heart is probably sufficient.  Birth includes the 
surgical removal of a child from its mother, as in the case of Caesarean 
section, as well as vaginal delivery. 
 
The thrust of the criminal law in relation to abortion has been to clearly demarcate the 
crimes of murder and manslaughter from the death of a fetus or unborn child.  The reason 
for this rests in the difficulty that if the legal definition of personhood was extended to 
include the fetus, than the law would recognize mother and fetus as two distinct legal 
persons.  This leads inevitably to a conflict of rights between the mother and fetus and 
even to the policing of pregnancy to ensure that a mother does nothing to harm her fetus 
in any way.’86   
 
Child Protection laws 
 
                                                 
84
 See Criminal Law Hasbury’s Laws of Australia  
85
 Cica N above at 32 
86
 Submission of the NSW Council for Civil Liberties and the UNSW Council for Civil Liberties to the 
NSW Attorney-General’s Review of the Law of Manslaughter in New South Wales, 7 February 2003, at 3 
 28 
Four Australian jurisdictions provide for some protection pre-birth, allowing for 
intervention by government authorities to ‘protect’ the unborn child.87    In Queensland a 
2004 amendment, s21A of the Child Protection Act 1999 applies to allow for civil 
intervention by the authorities “..if, before the birth of a child, the chief executive 
reasonably suspects the child may be in need of protection after he or she is born.”  The 
provision has been described as giving “…much more extensive protection to unborn 
children than any other Australian provision. The legislation appears to cover unborn 
children from the time pregnancy has been detected in the pregnant woman, and covers 
situations where grievous bodily harm is inflicted on, or a serious disease is transmitted 
to, the unborn child”88.  In South Australia the Children’s Protection Act 1993 covers 
unborn children, in Western Australia the Child Welfare Act 1947 allows a notification to 
be recorded and an assessment conducted to determine whether a likelihood of harm 
exists for the child once born, and to plan for the safety of the child after birth.  It has 
been stated that the NSW Children and Young Persons Care and Protection Act 1998 
also provides for reports concerning unborn children.  The stated intention is to provide 
early intervention to reduce the risks to the baby at the time of birth.
89
 
 
Births, Deaths and Marriages 
 
At common law if a child is not born alive there can be no death.  This common law rule 
has been modified by births, deaths and marriages legislation in all states and territories
90
 
which provides for the compulsory registration of births, deaths and marriages.   
 
In all jurisdictions the definitions section of the legislation means that a birth includes a 
still-birth.  A still born child is defined as a child of at least 20 weeks gestation, or who 
weighed at least 400 grams at birth or delivery and who has not exhibited any sign of 
respiration or heartbeat or other sign of life after birth.
91
  A still-born child must therefore 
be registered as being born and in South Australia and Western Australia must also be 
registered as being dead as in South Australia and Western Australia a death includes a 
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still-birth.
92
 In the remaining jurisdictions the definition of death specifically excludes a 
still-birth, however in these jurisdictions a still-born child must be buried or cremated.
93
   
 
In all jurisdictions particular procedures must be followed in relation to the medical 
examination and the disposal of the body of a still-born child.  A child which is less than 
20 weeks gestation or 400 grams in weight need not be buried or cremated as it is 
considered pre-viable.  Hospitals where such children are born are governed by the 
Human Tissue Acts, which generally provide that once tissue is removed from a person 
they have no right to determine what will be done with that tissue.  The human tissue 
legislation specifically include fetal tissue within the definition of tissue.
94
  
 
The legislation which regulates births and deaths clearly reflects a pre-birth continuum.  
Pivoting around the notion of viability, the 20 week or 400 grams provision delineates 
between a fetus that may survive birth and one which will not.   
 
 
Accident compensation acts 
 
In Victoria recovery of common law damages in respect of injuries which arise out of 
employment or transport accidents is limited only to those cases where a person suffers a 
serious injury.  In both the Accidents Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) and the Transport 
Accident Act 1986 “a serious injury” is defined to include “loss of a foetus”.95 Further a 
2004 amendment to the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) section 98C provides for 
compensation for non-economic loss and states that the amount of non-economic loss ‘in 
respect of an injury resulting in the loss of one foetus or of the loss of more than one 
foetus is $53 270’ defining in  s98C(4) that ‘foetus means the conceptus beyond the 
sixteenth week of development.’  In the ACT and Victoria victims of crime legislation 
allows for the award of financial assistance to persons who suffer very serious injury and 
the relevant legislation defines serious injury as including “loss of a feotus”.96 
 
Immigration:  must the interests of an unborn child be considered? 
 
The common law “born alive” rule has been specifically recognised and applied in the 
area of immigration law in Australia where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has 
refused to include the interests of unborn children as relevant considerations on the 
exercise of ministerial discretion to refuse visas to their parents. 
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The decision of Deputy President Forgie in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in Ly 
and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] AATA 339 (28 April, 
2000) considered whether an unborn child was a “child” whose the interests were a 
“primary consideration” within a Ministerial Direction97 governing the exercise of 
discretion under s.501 Migration Act 1958 ( Cth ) to refuse a visa to the mother on 
character grounds. 
 
The High Courts decision in Minister for Immigration and ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 
128 ALR 353 was considered. There the High court was concerned with the relevance of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which requires states to ensure 
that children are not separated from their parents unless separation is in the best interests 
of the child (Article 9). The Convention was ratified by Australia on 17 September, 1990 
and came into force in Australia on 16 January 1991 was held by a High Court majority 
not to be part of the municipal law of Australia. It was held however that ratification of a 
convention is a positive statement by the executive government that the executive will act 
in accordance with the Convention and that statement is an adequate foundation for a 
legitimate expectation that administrative decision makers will act in conformity with the 
Convention.  
 
The issue in the Ly case was whether the Convention required the interests of an unborn 
child to be considered when exercising discretion under the Migration Act. Article 1 of 
the Convention defines a child as a “human being below the age of 18 years…” so the 
issue for Deputy President Forgie was whether the unborn child was a ‘human being’. 
The Deputy President referred to various other international instruments which referred 
to “humanness” but which provide no definition of a “human being”. She referred to 
some specific protections provided in those instruments to unborn children. She also 
referred to the criminal law and the civil common law in Australia, in particular the ‘born 
alive’ rule noting the “fiction” which has sometimes been employed to protect the rights 
of the unborn. 
 
The Deputy President decided ultimately that:  
 
…an unborn child cannot be regarded as a human being in that context (of the 
Convention). That is not to say that an unborn child does not receive 
acknowledgement in the Preamble to the Convention and specific recognition 
that it requires special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth. Equally the unborn child receives 
specific recognition in the DRC (the Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
1959) and implied recognition in the ICCPR’s (International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1996) prohibition of capital punishment upon 
pregnant women. But it is specifically because the international instruments 
need to give specific or implied recognition to unborn children in specific 
circumstances that adds weight to the conclusion that its general provisions 
relate to a child who is separate from its mother and so has become a human 
being as it has been understood at common law. 
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Accordingly the Deputy Commissioner decided that the welfare of an unborn child was 
not a primary consideration when exercising discretion under s. 501 Migration Act 
1958(Cth) because an unborn child was not a” human being” within the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child definition
98
. 
 
Interestingly, the year following the decision in Ly, the Migration Review Tribunal 
decided in an application by Dang, Van Dong that on an application for a spouse visa: 99  
 
Australia’s obligations to the as yet unborn child under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child do include exercising discretion in 
favour of enabling a child to be with both parents.   
 
The issue here is not identical to that in Ly as that case concerned the question of exercise 
of the ministerial discretion not to refuse a visa on character grounds under S. 501 of the 
Act. The issue in Dang concerned the question of the issue of a visa on the basis of 
marriage to an Australian citizen where there were reasons of a “strongly compassionate” 
nature. It is noteworthy though,  that the two tribunals take opposite views of the effect of 
Australia’s obligations under the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child on a 
consideration of the welfare of a child who is unborn at the time of the determination. 
 
 
Family Law    
 
In the Marriage of F it was held that a fetus is not a ‘child’ for the purposes of a 
husband’s application to the court for an injunction in order to prevent his estranged wife 
terminating a pregnancy.
100
 The court held that a child did not obtain a legal personality 
until birth and that:
101
 
 
it is a matter of violent public debate whether an abortion amounts to the killing of a 
child. That is really a moral or ethical question and it is not a question which this 
court, or  any court, for that matter, is required to answer. This court, like any other, 
is concerned with legal rights and obligations, not moral or ethical ones. My task is 
to interpret and apply the law, not any particular moral or ethical precepts. 
 
The court also decided  that an unborn child does not have a claimed right to be allowed 
to come into existence as a person.
102
  Indeed Justice Lindenmayer determined in In the 
Marriage of F that the references to ‘child’ in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) refer to a 
living child, stating:
 103
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of an unborn child in the later case of Zefis and Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs [2002] 
AATA 700 (16 August 2002). 
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 Dang, Van Dong [2001] MRTA 3843 (22 August 2001), Presiding Member: Megan Hodgkinson 
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 In the Marriage of F (1989) 13 Fam LR 189 FLC 92-031 
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 At para [17]  
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 “..which right I have held does not exist” at para [35] 
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 At para [38] 
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In my opinion, the only section of the Act in which the word "child" includes an 
unborn child is s.66X, which deals with the maintenance of a mother by the father of 
an  illegitimate child during the childbirth maintenance period. 
 
Section 66X has now been replaced by an identical section 68B which recognises a pre-
birth entity as it allows a woman to sue for personal support during a pregnancy from 
someone that the mother is not married to but who is responsible for the child. It follows 
that parenting orders cannot be made under s 64B relating to unborn children.  Nor can 
orders be made by the court with respect to unborn children under other parts of the Act 
which refer to children such as s 67ZC.  Another example is In the Marriage of Diesel 
(1980) 6 Fam LR 1 which discusses section 63 establishing that an unborn child is not a 
child of the marriage for the purposes of this section as the statute was intended to 
operate from birth not from conception. 
 
Social Security law  
 
In Re Department of Social Security and Abaroa (1991) 22 ALD 787 Deputy President P 
Gerber of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal raised but did not answer the question of 
residency for the purposes of determining an entitlement to an invalid pension of a child 
on turning 16 years of age where the qualifying event for the pension must have 
‘occurred at a time when the claimant was an Australian resident.’  The child’s disability 
occurred in utero. President Gerber states: 
 
Applied to this case, the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from cerebral palsy at 
birth whilst he was an Australian resident (it is a nice question whether, assuming 
the injury occurred in utero, a foetus can be said to be “resident” anywhere) and is 
not otherwise disqualified from his claim by the exclusionary provisions of s 28. 
 
Clearly raised as a point of speculation the above comment by Deputy President Gerber 
indicates how an area of law such as social security may need to determine such 
questions as to where on the pre-birth continuum the unborn child will be incorporated 
into decision making.  
 
Sport and discrimination law  
 
In Gardner v National Netball League Pty Ltd [325 FC 260]
104
 an application for an 
interim injunction was made under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s46PP.  The applicant was a participant in the National 
Netball League who was 15 weeks pregnant and attempting to play netball in 
contravention of the League ban on pregnant players.  The injunction was granted as 
expert evidence was given that the fetus is not endangered if applicant continued playing 
                                                 
104
 [2001] FMCA 50, BC200104127 on 18 July.  The issue was also mentioned in Ferneley v Boxing 
Authority of NSW (2001) 191 ALR 739 before Wilcox J where a discrimination claim by a female boxer 
applying for registration as a professional was rejected, a reason given that: “Special risks for women 
appear to be associated with injury to the reproductive organs and, in particular, to a potential risk to an 
unborn foetus if a women were pregnant at the time of her involvement in a boxing match.” 
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League netball until 20 weeks pregnant.  Discrimination law demonstrates a recognition 
of the unborn for the purposes of the pre-birth continuum at 20 weeks.  After this lineal 
time point the fetus requires/deserves/is given the protection of the law and a pregnant 
woman is held not to be discriminated against if she is prevented from playing sport.  
 
Ethical Regulations – Fetal Tissue Transplantation 
 
Research on fetal tissue including the transplantation of such tissue is governed by 
ethical guidelines determined by the National Health and Medical Research 
Council.  Such research may have critical wider repercussions for possibilities of 
cures for diseases such as Parkinsons and Alzheimers.
105
  The regulation of fetal 
tissue research explicitly incorporates notions of viability.  It determines that 
recognition on the pre-birth continuum arises at the point of  viability, when a fetus 
has the capacity to survive without the mother if born prematurely.   
 
The National Health and Medical Research Council Statement on Human 
Experimentation has attached to it a Supplementary Note published in 1983 and states 
that it is ‘intended as a guide on ethical matters for research involving the human fetus or 
human fetal tissue.’ 106 The Guidelines restrict research to a previable fetus stating that 
research should not be carried out when there is a beating heart or other signs of life:
 107
 
 
For the purposes of medical research, a separated previable fetus is at present 
regarded as one that has not attained a gestational age of 20 weeks and does not 
exceed 400g in weight. Adoption of this description will prevent inadvertent 
withholding of life-sustaining treatment from a separated fetus that may in fact be 
viable. 
 
Conclusion 
The above analysis reveals that a uniform legal approach to defining the fetus is an 
impossibility.  Instead, a ‘silo’ approach, whereby every legal area has separate 
determinations on the legal recognition of the fetus is now a reality.  This approach, apart 
from being pragmatic, is arguably the most appropriate.  Areas of law such as patent law 
cannot be equated with an application to the court to restrain an abortion – clearly patent 
                                                 
105
 Such as the use of human fetal tissue: Tuch  BE, Scott H, Armati PJ, Tabiin MT and Wang LP, “Use of 
human fetal tissue for biomedical research in Australia, 1994–2002” (2003) 179(10) Medical Journal of 
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law, family law, criminal law as well as the other areas identified in this article will have 
different policy requirements and serve varying social, economic and moral interests.   
 
The fact that the law recognizes the fetus along a continuum prior to birth frees the policy 
maker, the judge and the legislator from the difficult definitional question embedded in 
morality, religion and ethics as to determining when human life begins (unless that is 
within the parameters of the law in question).  The pre-birth continuum accords with 
Seymour’s view108 that the law has moved past the traditional case law definitional 
approach of asking what is the fetus. Further, the identification of a legal pre-birth 
continuum both debunks the myth of the prevalence of the born alive rule and exposes 
generalizations whereby legal ‘trends’ are viewed as ‘…attaching ever greater 
significance to the foetus as it approaches viability.’109 Or that the elevation of “…the 
foetus to patient status is a product of the medicalisation of reproduction and reflects a 
medical perception of the maternal foetal/ relationship.”110  This is the case as a pre-birth 
continuum highlights that the law is responsive, driven by policy and thereby reacting to 
developments in an ad hoc non-uniform fashion.  
 
The following table demonstrates the contrasting points of recognition of the fetus along 
the pre-birth continuum by the diverse areas of Australian law considered in this article.  
Clearly the traditional ‘born alive’ rule no longer informs decision making in many of 
these very challenging areas.  Rather the legislature and the courts have adopted a 
twentieth century approach which recognizes a ‘pre-birth continuum’. 
 
TABLE 1: Overview of the Pre-birth Continuum 
 
AREA LAW FIRST RECOGNITION 
Inheritance 
law/succession 
Common 
law/Legislation 
Frozen embryo/Unborn 
Torts Common law Before conception  
Criminal Legislation In utero (a range) 
Contracts Legislation Embryo fetus 
Births/Deaths Legislation 20 weeks (or 400 grams) 
Patents Legislation Process of creation 
Cloning Legislation <8 weeks 
Infertility Legislation <8 weeks 
Child Protection Legislation In utero 
Medical Research Ethical guidelines 20 weeks (or 400 grams) 
Sports law / 
Discrimination 
Legislation 20 weeks 
Parens patriae Common law Birth 
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28. 
109
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Child protection Statute In utero 
Accident 
compensation 
Legislation In utero 
Immigration  Legislation Birth 
Family Law Legislation In utero 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
